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rn THE SLThLl'L ·, ()F TH[ ST.L.TE OF UTAH 
SThTE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent. Case No. 18998 
vs. 
TIMOTHY AND MILDRED LAIRBY, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
BRIEF OF 
SUPPLEMENTAL ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT BELOW COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY 
DENYING RIGHT OF CONFRONThTION AS 
GUARANTEED BY THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, 
SIXTH AMEtlDMENT, AND THE UTAH STATE CONSTITU-
TION, ARTICLE I, SECTION 12. 
The right to cross examine, embodied within the right 
of confrontation, is an invaluable right guaranteed by Article I, 
Section 12 of the Utah State Constitution and in the Sixth 
hmendment of the United States Constitution. 
In the leading case of Davis vs. Alaska, 415 US 308, 
94 s.ct. 1105 (1974), the importance of one's right to cross 
examination was explained as follows: 
"Cross examination is the principal means by which the 
believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony 
is tested .... We have recognized that the exposure of a 
witness' in testifying is a proper and important 
function of the constitutionally protected right of cross 
exar:,1r,al1un. 1 ' 
This court stressed the accu,,,,,ci'" r J ,Jht of cross-
examination in State v. Chesnut, 6.'l 12.!l' (Ut. l98CJ) 
where Justice Maughn, writing for a unanimous court, stated 
as follows: 
"The right of cross-examination is an integral part of the 
right of confrontation, which is guaranteed by Article I, 
Section 12 of the Constitution of Utah and the Sixth 
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. 
The cross-examination of a witness, testifying against 
the accused, provides a means of attacking his credibility 
and thus the substance of his testimony (cites omitted). 
Furthermore, Section 78-24-1 provides that in every case 
the credibility of the witness may be drawn in question by 
his motives. The exposure of a witness' motivation in 
testifying is a proper and important function of the consti-
tutionally protected right of cross-examination (cites 
omitted). A trial court should be particularly solicitous 
of cross-examination intended to disclose bias or prejudice." 
(Id., at 1233). 
See also Hutchings v. State, 518 P.2d 767 (Alaska 1974); State v. 
Anderson, 612 P.2d 78 (Ut. 1980); State v. Maestas, 564 P.2d 1386 
(Ut. 1977). 
Partiality, or any acts, relationships or motives 
reasonably likely to produce it, may be proved to impeach credi-
bility (3A Wigmore, Evidence (Chadbourne rev.) Sections 943-969; 
Hale, Bias As Affecting Credibility, 1 Hastings L.J. 1 (1949)) 
Facts which show bias are not "collateral," and the cross-
examiner is not required to "take the answer of the witness," 
but may call other witnesses to prove them (State v. Day, 95 
S.W.2d 1183, 1184; Smith v. U.S., 283 F.2d 16 (6th Cir. 1960) 
Smith v. Hornkohl, 90 N.W.2d 347 (Neb. 1958)). 
Where a trial court has unduly restricted a defendant 
in the exercise of his constitutional right of cross-exan,irat1on, 
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the "hdrIT.less error" :-·t aradrd compels reversal, unless the 
rev1ew1ng court cari cJ<-clan· rl ucl1<cf that the error was harmless 
beyond a r<.:asonablc doubt (State v. Chesnut, supra, at 1233; 
Chapmar. v. California, 386 u. 18, 24; 87 s.ct. 824, 828 (1967)) 
Appellants were r<.:peatcdly denied their constitutional 
rights of confrontation and cross-examination in the trial court. 
On one such occasion (Tr.28), defense counsel, Lionel Farr, was 
attempting to cross-examir.e Wanda Lairby as to bias, interest 
and motive to fabricate, as follows: 
QUESTION: "And at the t1:-c.e of the divorce wasn't there a 
question of custody raised?" 
ANSWER: "At the time of the divorce?" 
QUESTION: "Yes." 
ANSWER: "No." 
QUESTION: "Isn't there still a custody hearing pending?" 
MR. FARR: "Your Honor, I object that this is not 
material to the case." 
THE COURT: "Objection is sustained." 
MR. LIONEL FARR: "I think that goes to the question of 
bias or prejudice, your Honor, as to custody, should she have 
custody of these children, she would have a motive here and 
so forth." 
THE COURT: "As the matter now stands, I don't know that 
there is any evidence of motive." 
Similar denials of Appellants' constitutional rights 
of confrontation and cross-examination occurred throughout the 
trial when defense counsel attempted to cross-examine Lisa Lairby 
(Tr. 172-173), Dr. William Palmer (Tr. 238), Violet Jones, 
Lisa's grandmother (Tr. 333, 334, 335), and Richard Long (Tr. 428, 
429, n1 I. 
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The court also unduly rest ti r\, ,, d• t t·r counsel 1 
questioning when he attempted to at\iKf: tliL· crcd1l1l1ty and 
establish the bias of the State's witnesses through his own 
witnesses (Tr. bottom 531, top botton• 532, 533 (Mildred 
Lairby); 641, 642 (Timothy Lairby)). 
The prejudicial violations of Appellants' constitu-
tional rights of confrontation, outlined above, constitute 
reversible error according to the standard established in 
Chapman v. California, supra, and adopted by this court in 
State v. Chesnut, supra. 
POINT II 
APPELLANTS WERE DENIED THEIR RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AS GUARANTEED BY THE SIXTH 
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND 
BY ARTICLE I, SECTION 12, UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION. 
Appellants' right to effective assistance of counsel 
is guaranteed under the Sixth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution as well as Article I, Section 12 of the Utah State 
Constitution. Until recently, the common law standard of ±_lleffec-
tive assistance of counsel was that "on appeal it fT'USt appear 
that counsel's lack of diligence of competence reduced the trial 
to a farce or a sham." (People v. Ibarra, 386 P.2d 487 (Cal. 196c 
State v. McNicol, 554 P.2d 203 (Ut. 1976); State v. Pierrcr., 583 
P.2d 69 (Ut. 1978)). Due to widespread criticism that the 
"farce or sham" standard was not stringer.t enough to protect 
an accused's right to effective assistance of counsel, a new 
standard has been adopted by this court and by the maJority of 
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courts throughout the r,<Jt1c;r ('i"'L, for example, People v. Pope, 
590 P. 859 (Cal. l (er, bar1c).) In the recent case of 
Codiannr,a v. MorrLs, V,r, l'.:d l!IJl (Ut. 1983) this court adopted 
the new standard, which 1s as follows: 
"The Sixth Amer:drrient demands that defense counsel exercise 
the skill, judqNont 
defense attorney." 
and diligence of a reasonably competent 
(emphasis added) 
In adopting this new staLdard this Court stated that it "includes 
all of the requirements the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit 
identified in its recent redefinition of the constitutional 
requirements of effective assistance of counsel." The case to 
which this Court referred was Dyer v. Crisp, 613 F.2d 275, 278 
(10th Cir. 1980) (en bane). 
The Tenth Circuit took the opportuLity to further 
clarify the standard it laid down in Dyer, supra, in the case of 
U.S. v. Porterfield, 624 F.2d 122 (10th Cir. 1980), at 124, 125, 
where it stated as follows: 
"The government argues that a showing of prejudice is 
essential, but we disagree. In passing, we mentioned 
(in the opinion) that the defendant in Dyer v. Crisp 
had not suffered prejudice. It is not accurate, however, 
to conclude that 'prejudice' is a second tier in the test 
of incompetency. Reasonable diligence and skill is the 
test! It would be a mockery in this case to say that the 
defendant was clearly guilty and that the incompetence of 
counsel made no difference. Where, as here, the incompe-
tence of counsel is pervasive, the defendant ought not to 
be required to prove prejudice on top of the inadequacy. 
The burden should be on the government to establish the lack 
of prejudice. See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 98 
s.ct. 1173 (1978) .... We need only conclude that the trial 
counsel's representation of the defendant failed to meet 
the requirements of the Constitution and constituted a 
failure to exercise the reasonable skill and diligence of 
a reasonably competent defense lawyer. We need not measure 
the extent of the prejudice or the extent of lack of 
effc:ct1vc assistance of counsel." (Id., at 124, 125.) 
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As stated above, once the lkfc·1,cLnd hi.le 1r»l his burdc·r. 
of establishing ineffective assistance· c-if ,.c,unscl, tlw Lu1·dcn 
should be upon the government to prove lack of prejudire due tu 
such ineffective assistance. See also Bazelon, 42 U.Cin.L.Rev. l: 
Finer, 58 Cornell L.Rev. 1077, 1093. 
Ineffective assistance of appellant's counsel in the 
court below was apparent from the moment trial began. When the 
court asked if defense counsel was ready to proceed on the 
morning of trial, defense attorney Lionel Farr indicated he was 
not prepared because he had not had any opportunity to interview 
or depose two of the State's witnesses (Tr. 122). When the court 
invited defense counsel to make an opening statement, he reserved 
that right until the opening of his case in chief (Tr. 7, 8). At 
the opening of the Defendant's case in chief, defense counsel 
made his opening statement (Tr. 469-471), which was, in part, as 
follows: 
"Lady and gentlemen of the jury and Your Honor and counsel 
and everybody else I'm supposed to acknowledge, comes time 
now for the defense to present evidence as to what they feel 
is important in this case •.•. As you have heard the evidence, 
we intend now to present the defense that we have mainly 
because of the facts that until you have made your decision, 
the defendants that I represent are not guilty and I hope 
that you have not made that decision at this point. That 
is the main inquiry I make at the beginning, that you be 
able to withhold any feeling of decision whatsoever until 
we have had a chance to make our consideration and that 
you were given that opportunity at that time to decide 
whether or not you could go through the whole trial and 
withhold any judgment whatsoever. It may have been hard 
to do. I don't know. For me it is hard sometimes lo JUmp 
to a conclusion. 
"But anyway, our case now will be to present the defcnJ0r.ts, 
let them speak. I don't think we're going to try and claim 
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silence and hu\'e Y'-"I .cf•"ccilcd" whether or not their silence 
rncd.n.s ar1ylh1r,r:. 
"And also character 1-11lrH•:,;--ec;. We try to--we will present 
basically tht' def en."' th0L U1c-sc thir.gs did not happen, 
that--
"The Court: 
to be. 
No. Just tell us what you think it's going 
"Mr. Lionel Farr: Well, I guess just to make a statement 
to try to introduce myself ar.d try to establish some 
rapport with you so that I can feel that I'm part of 
the program, too. But that is the limitation of my 
opening statement. I can't go into evidence. 
"The Court: Mr. Farr, you can tell the evidence, what you 
think the evidence is go"ng to be, but don't comrnent on it. 
"Mr. Lionel Farr: Well, we'll let the witnesses testify 
then, and that will be--that will be the same, Judge. 
Thank you." 
The above excerpt shows that Appellants were denied the oppor-
tunity to present the jury with an intelligent, cohesive descrip-
tion of their case in the rnanner to be expected of a reasonably 
competent defense attorney. 
Ineffective assistance of counsel was also evidenced 
during the State's case in chief, when defense counsel failed 
to make a motion to strike the testimony of four of the State's 
witnesses. The State called Craig Duvall, a police officer from 
the Provo Police Departrnent, Christine Swanson, a clinical 
psychologist for Granite School District and once employed at 
Primary Children's Medical Center; Finia Feuiaki, an employee 
of the Divis1or. of Family Services in Provo; and Kelly Powers, 
a protective service worker from the State Department of Social 
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Services, Division of Field Services. 
officials testified that thcy had seen aLJ talked tu Lisa 
Beyond that, they offered no probative as to the trutl. 
of the allegations. Although a reasonably competent defense 
attorney would have made a motion to strike the testimony of each 
of these four witnesses and requested an admonition that the 
jury disregard the fact that these witnesses were called, 
Appellants received no assistance in this regard (Tr. 179-250). 
Ineffective assistance of Defendants' trial court 
counsel was also apparent when defense counsel attempted to 
impeach a State's witness based on prior inconsistent staterner,ts 
from the preliminary hearing (Tr. 391, 411, 418). Unfortunately, 
defense counsel had never requested transcripts of the prelimin-
ary hearing and consequently he was unable to use prior incon-
sistent statements from that hearing to impeach any of the 
State's witnesses. 
Another example of the ineffective assistance of 
counsel afford to Defendants is evidenced by the following 
dialogue (Tr. 445), which defense counsel allowed to take place 
without objection: 
(redirect examination by Mr. Paul Farr) 
QUESTION: "Detective Blunck, did you ever ask Mildred 
Lairby if she would talk to you?" 
ANSWER: "I did one time." 
QUESTION: "What was her response?" 
ANSWER: "That she wanted to talk and consult with her 
attorney." 
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Not only did the above dialogue proceed without objection by 
defense counsel, defense cour:sel reinforced the highly prejudicial 
inference from this dialogue on recross-examination (Tr. 447), 
when he asked: 
QUESTION: "So, after the Miranda warning was given 
she did not say anything to you; is that correct?" 
ANSWER: "No sir. She requested her attorney." 
As noted later by the trial court (Tr. 685), testimony that an 
accused has exercised his constitutional rights is ordinarily 
reversible error and would have resulted in a mistrial had there 
been an objection by defense counsel. 
Defense counsel also failed to exercise the skill, 
judgment and diligence of a reasonably cor:-,petent defense attorney 
in eliciting character witness testimony (Tr. 481-583). Although 
it will subsequently be argued in this memorandum that some 
admissible character witness testimony did come into evidence, 
the prejudice resulting from defense counsel's inept approach to 
examination of these character witnesses is manifest in the 
court's withdrawal of a jury instruction on character evidence 
(Tr. 673) 
Further ineffective assistance of counsel occurred 
when defense counsel allowed a highly prejudicial document to be 
admitted into evidence without ever having seen, or even requested 
to see, the document (Tr. 627). 
Additionally, Defendants were denied their right to 
effective assistance of counsel during closing arguments (Tr. 703-
7 26) . Defense counsel's closing argument fell far below the level 
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of quality expected from a re<Jsor,,-jl I y ''""!,I· r:t ckfcnsc att 01 r.• Y. 
Although not exhe>usl1vv, the above C'Xor•.1·1«,; arc 0:uff 1 _ 
cient to illustrate the pervasive inc·ffcct1vc a;;c-:istancC; of 
received by Appellants in the court below. A r c· v 1 cw of l h c tr i a J 
transcript reveals that not only was defense counsel's ass1star.cl 
ineffective as measured by the new "reasonably competent defcn 
attorney" standard, the assistance was also ineffective accordir.g 
to the less stringent "farce or sham" test. While Appellants 
maintain that they have no burden to show prejudice result1nn 
from the ineffective assistance of counsel, the prejudicial 
effect is unmistakable. 
POINT III 
THE COURT BELOW ERRED BY REFUSING TO SECURE 
THE ATTENDANCE OF AN OUT-OF-STATE WITNESS 
PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 
77-21-3. 
The Uniform Act to Secure the Attendance of Witnesses 
From Without of State in Criminal Proceedings, as adopted in 
Arizona (Ariz. Rev. Statutes Annot. Section 13-4092) (1956), 
and in Utah (Utah Code Annotated Section 77-21-3, 1953), vests 
the Court with authority to compel the attendance of witnesses 
located outside the forum state. The Court is free to invoke 
the compulsory process of the Uniform Act in behalf of either 
the prosecution or the defense (State v. Leggroan, 389 P.26 14: 
(Ut. 1964)). Furthermore, Article I, Section 12 of the Utah 
State Constitution guarantees that "1n criminal proc;ccutions 
the accused shall have the right ... to have compulsory process 
to compel the attendance of witnesses in his owr. behalf .... " 
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The record show'; that dc·feri: c L'Our.ooel informed the Court of its 
desire to call Tracy Lono to testify immediately after learning 
that tlie State had decided lier testimony was not useful. 
(Tr. 125, 126) The court erred in disclaiming all authority by 
which to compel her attendance, especially in light of the 
materiality and relevance of Tracy Long's anticipated testimony. 
POINT IV 
APPELLANTS WERE Dr:tH CD THEIR RIGHTS TO PRESENT 
CHARACTER WITNESS EVIDENCE TO THE JURY, AND 
TO A JURY INC:TR\X l lOti ON CHARACTER WITNESS 
EVIDENCE. 
To be admissible, character witness testimony as to an 
accused's reputation must be confined to the particular traits 
which are relevant to the offense charged (State v. Thompson, 
199 P 161 (Ut. 1921)), and the witness giving such testimony 
must have personal knowledge of the general reputation of the 
accused in the community in which he resides or has resided 
(State v. Thoernke, 92 NW 480 (No.Dak. ) ; Halley v. Tichenor, 
9 4 NW 4 7 2 (I a. ) ) . The "community" in which one lives is 
not necessarily a geographical unit, but is rather composed of 
those relationships with others which arise where one works, 
worships, shops, relaxes, and lives, as explained in U.S. v. 
White, 225 F Supp 514 (D.D.C. 1963), reversed 349 F.2d 965. 
See also State v. Miller, 628 P.2d 444 (Or. 1981); State v. 
Buckner, 214 NW 2d 164 (Ia. 1979).) The point in time at which 
the accused's character is relevant is at a time at or prior to 
the date of the commission of the alleged offense (State v. 
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Rivera, 612 P.2d 526 (Ha. 198(1); )d_,_s. \·. iiull, lllo, 
1180 (4th Cir. 1969); People v. lla"cor1L, 392 lll", 113:' 
(Ill. 1979).) 
The record of the proceedings in the trial court bel 
reveals that despite defense counsel's inept approach to 
admissible character evidence, some admissible character evidence 
did come in (Tr. 486, 493 (lines 13-15), 514), therC>by entitling 
Defendants to a jury instruction on character evidencC' (character 
evidence jury instruction withdrawn over defense counsel's 
objection, Tr. 673). More importantly, however, the transcript 
reveals that the court below unduly restricted the character 
evidence sought to be elicited by defense counsel (Tr. 486, 511, 
512, 577). The ineffective manner with which defense counsel 
attempted to lay foundation for character evidence, together with 
the court's unduly narrow interpretation of admissible character 
witness evidence combined to constitute a denial of Appellants' 
rights to present evidence in their own behalf. 
POINT V 
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN RULING ON THE ADMIS-
SIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY AND IN QUASHING 
A SUBPOEt'A. OF APPELLANTS' EXPERT. 
During the course of testimony a1ven by Dr. Wi!liaI". 
Palmer, a pediatrician, he was allowed over thr repeated obJe<-
tions of defense counsel to give his opinion that Lairby 
had been sexually abused. (Tr. 226) Although Dr. Palr0r 
a physical examination, he expressly stated that no part of h15 
opinion was based upon the physical cxarination (Tr. 22B). 
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Rather, the opin1or. of !Jr. f·alrrer was admitted as being explicitly 
basco on what Lisa LairLy said to him. (Tr. 229) The record 
reveals that there was no foundation laid as to whether such 
words, phrases or vocabulary was used by Lisa Lairby are 
typically relied upon by others in Dr. Palmer's field of exper-
tise, in the course of determining whether sexual abuse has 
occurred. No foundation was laid as to the trustworthiness of 
the factual predicates upon which Dr. Palmer relied in forming 
his opinion. No foundation was given as to Dr. Palmer's qualifi-
cations in determining the occurrence of sexual abuse by oral 
evaluations. And finally, no foundation was given to show why 
Dr. Palmer would be more qualified to give an opinion as to 
whether Lisa Lairby was telling the truth based on what she 
said than would be the average juror. 
The leap of faith required to accept Dr. Palmer's 
opinion without further foundation is analogous to that discussed 
by the court in Machera v. Garfield, 434 P.2d 756 (Ut. 1967). 
During that case, which involved an automobile accident, an Ogden 
City Police lieutenant was asked to give his opinion as to the 
speed of a vehicle at the time of impact, based upon his examin-
ation of the damage to the vehicle. The court refused to allow 
the lieutenant's opinion because it was no more trustworthy than 
would be the opinion of any one of the jurors when equally 
informed as to the extent of damage to the vehicle. (Id., at 
759) See also, Frye v. U.S., 293 F 1013, 54 App. D.C. 46 (1923) 
and Tice v. Richardson, 644 P.2d 490 (Ks. 1983). The qualifying 
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of a witness as an expert does riot r1·nJc r I is every conclusior. 
immune from challenge. U.S. v. Raqanu, 4'7•o F.2d 4ln (5th Cir. 
1973); Tennessee Valley Authority v. An Eascn.c 1.t and R1qht •:>f hd· 
537 F.Supp 3 (E.D.Tenn. 1981). Such is the case· with Dr. Palr··cor' 
opinion. There is no foundation in the record to show that a 
pediatrician's "finding" of sexual abuse based solely on what thE 
alleged victim said is trustworthy. Furthermore, any supposed 
probative value of Dr. Palmer's opinion was outweighed by its 
prejudicial impact on the factfinder under Rule 45, Utah Rules 
of Evidence. 
Finally, Rule 56(2) Utah Rules of Evidence states in 
part as follows: 
"If the witness is testifying as an expert, testimony of the 
witness in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to 
such opinions as the judge finds are •... (b) within the 
scope of the special knowledge, skill, experience or train-
ing possessed by the witness." 
From the above authorities it is evident that Dr. Palmer's 
opinion should never have been admitted in evidence. 
While the court admitted Dr. Palmer's opinion that a 
particular witness was telling the truth based on what she said 
to him (Tr. 221, lines 8-10; 229), the trial court prohibited 
defense counsel from eliciting an opinion on the same issue 
from a licensed psychologist, Dr. Barbara Liebroder. In the 
words of the court: 
"There is no law I know of that pcrrr.1 ts sof'lebody lo core,, 
into this court and usurp the preroqat1ve of the Jury and 
tell the jury whether or not someone is t<:ll1nc; the truth 
or whether they are fantas1z1ng, or whethc1 they were able· 
to influence someone else." (Tr. 467) 
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The above statemrnt by thr court 
the recent holding by thib c 0 urt 
is 
in 
directly inconsistent with 
State v. 
Utah s.ct., FctJ. lt., 1984, tlo. 17914, where a psychiatrist's 
opir.ion concerninu the crrdii•ility of a witness and the 
witness' tendccr,cy to fantacize was held admissible. The mere 
fact that the conclusion of a qualified expert trenches upon a 
jury issue does not compel its exclusion. U.S. v. Milton, 555 
F.2d 1198 (5th Circ. 197CI). Where an expert's specialized know-
ledge with regard to a person's credibility or believability will 
assist the tryer of fact, such evidence is admissible (State v. 
Miller, supra; U.S. v Hiss, SS F.2d 559 (S.D.N.Y. 1950)) 
The trial court also questioned the admissibility of 
Dr. Liebroder's anticipated testimony due to an alleged psycholo-
gist-patient privilege (Tr. 460). As generally recognized at 
common law, however, suer. a privilege arises only when the purpose 
of the examination was for giving curative advice or treatment, 
and communications made to an examiner invited to the consulta-
tion at the opponent's instance is not privileged (City and County 
of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 234 P.2d 26 (Cal. 1951); 
Wigrnore, Evidence (Chadbourne rev.) Section 2382) The record 
shows that Wanda Lairby's psychological evaluation by 
Dr. Liebroder was not for the purpose of curative treatment, and 
it was at the instance of the defendants in this action (Tr. 340, 
341). No privilege ever arose concerning Dr. Liebroder's 
examination of Wanda Lairby. Neither was the court justified in 
quashing the subpoena of Dr. Liebroder based on the alleged 
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insufficiency of the witness fee, ace in City anc 
County of San Francisco v. Superior Court, 
and authorities cited therein. 
Although the court questioned tlte relevance and 
materiality of Dr. Liebroder's anticipated testimony (Tr. 463) 
the long-acknowledged legal standard with regard to relevance 
and materiality of expert testimony is whether such testimony 
would assist the jury in weighing the evidence. (Machera v. 
Garfield, 434 P.2d 756 (Ut. 1967)) Based on this standard, 
Dr. Liebroder's psychological findings certainly would have been 
relevant and material in assessing the credibility of Wanda 
Lairby and any influence she may have exercised over her 
daughter's testimony, as will be discussed shortly. The quashal 
of Dr. Liebroder's subpoena was a denial of Appellants' constitu-
tional right to present evidence in their own behalf. 
POINT VI 
THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANTS' 
MOTION FOR A PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION. 
A leading case on the issue of when a court should 
order psychiatric examination of a complaining witness in a sex 
offense case is Ballard v. Superior Court, 410 P.2d 838 (Cal. 
1966). The following passage from the Ballard opinion is relevant 
at this point; 
"A number of leading authorities have suggested that in a 
case in which a defendant faces a charge of a sex violation 
the complaining witness, if her testimony is uncorroborated, 
should be required to submit to a psychiatric examination ... 
In urging psychiatric interviews for complaining 
in sex cases, some prominent psychiatrists have 
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thut a wun1un c,1 CJl 1 J nai falsely accuse a person of a sex 
crim0 ac-- 0 n_-ul\ cd d -er-t0J condition that transforms into 
fcJt1ti1sy a '--1ecLful bic,JogirciJ urge. Such a charge may like-
flow from an tEndency directed to the person 
accused or from u rh1lJish desire for notoriety ••• Professor 
Wigmore, ir1 a widely 4uc,tcd pC1ssage, stated, 'I"o Judge 
shuuld ever let a sex offense charge go to the jury unless 
the female compluinunt's socid] history and mental makeup 
have been examined and testifiea to by a qualified physician 
(cites omitted).' ..• Ti1i:o concerr, is sti'1l_ulated by the possi-
bility that a believable complaining witness, who suffers 
from an emotional condition inducing her belief that she 
has been subJected to a sexual offense, may charge some 
male with that offcnst. Thus, the testimony of a sympathy-
arousing child may lead to the conviction of an unattractive 
defendant, subjecting him to a lengthy prison term." 
The standard adopted by the Ballard court, together 
with the maJority of courts who have dealt with this issue, was 
that the trial judge should order a psychiatric examination of 
the complaining witness in a case involving a sex violation if 
the defendant presents a reason for such an examina-
tion (Id, at 91). 
Evidence of a "corr.pelling reason" to order a psychiatric 
evaluation of Wanda and Lisa Lairby pursuant to defense counsel's 
repeated motions is found throughout the trial record (see especially 
Tr. 82, 84, 85, 86, 134, 136, 143, 150, 151, 157, 239) !-. brief 
review of the record reveals that if ever there was a compelling 
reason for a psychological evaluation in a sex offense action, 
the case at bar was it. Despite this widespread evidence of 
influence upon Lisa Lairby's testimony at trial, the trial judge 
concludc:d that "there is nothing before the Court that indicates 
that clnld was influenced in any manner whatsoever by her mother 
as to her testimony." (Tr. 124) 
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While counsel acknowlcdyt'ei tl" lrial court's discrcluJc, 
to order a psychiatric evaluation, it is the Jefendant's puo:it 1 
when faced with the compelling reasons as outlined herctoforL, 
the court below abused its discretion in defendant's 
motion for such psychiatric evaluation. Although the court 
based its reasoning, in part, on lack of timeliness in making 
such motion, the Supreme Court Clerk's Record on Appeal indicates 
that Defendant's first motion for psychiatric evaluation occurrec 
on July 11, 1981, almost one and a half years prior to trial 
(Supreme Court Clerk's Record on Appeal, p. 9). 
POINT VII 
THE COURT BELOW ERRED BY ADMITTING ONLY A 
PORTION OF A DOCUMENT TAKEN OUT OF CONTEXT. 
It is defendant's position on appeal that the court 
below corrur,i tted reversible error in admitting only a portion of 
a document which was highly prejudicial when admitted out of 
context from the remaining portions of that document (Tr. 619-658). 
The confusion, indecision, and lack of direction at this point 
the proceedings, as evidenced from the record, placed undue 
emphasis on a highly prejudicial portion of a document which 
should have been clearly inadmissible under Rule 45, Utah Rules 
of Evidence to begin with. When, however, the trial court 
admitted the partial document into evidence the preJudicicJl 
impact was aggravatedsir.cethe context from which the aJm1ttcd 
statements were taken was excluded. It is Appellanls' positior 
that this was an abuse of discretion. U.S. v. Walker, 652 F2d 
708, 713 (7th Cir. 1981) 
- lP -
POINT VIII 
THE COURT ElEUJW COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY 
ALLO\HtlG INTCJ EVIDEt1CE TE:STIMONY SO INHERENTLY 
PROBABLE AS TO TO NO EVIDENCE AT ALL. 
Although the question of credibility is ordinarily one 
for the tryer of fact, that rule must give way when testimony is 
viewed on appeal as incredible as a matter of law. People v. 
Quinones, 402 NYS 2d 196 (1978). A reviewing court will overturn 
the jury on the question of credibility of the witnesses when 
evidence presented is so improbable, unbelievable, or unsatis-
factory as to raise a serious question as to the guilt of the 
defendant. People v. Dunn, 365 NE2d 164 (Ill. App. 1977). 
Generally, there must exist either a physical impossibility that 
it is true, or its falsity must be apparent without resorting 
to inferences or deductions. People v. Duncan, 171 Cal. Rptr. 
406, 115 C.A. 3d 418 (1981). See also, People v. Moore, 222 
NE 2d 95 (Ill. App. 1966); People v. Porter, 422 NE 2d 213 
( Il 1. App. 1981) . 
The record of the trial court proceedings reveals that 
several aspects of the uncorroborated testimony of Lisa Lairby 
were inherently improbable. For example, when asked, "Do you 
know how many times you were hurt at Tim 's house?", Lisa responded, 
"Almost a hundred" (Tr. 51). Lisa also testified that "puke" 
came out of Timothy Lairby's "winky" and that it looked like 
"little green spots" (Tr. 58), and that "it was yellow and brown 
mixed, ... lots of yellow and brown" (Tr. 155). Lisa stated that 
Timothy Lairby's winky touched "the inside" of her privates, 
although Dr. Palmer, who examined Lisa, testified that there had 
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been nothing larger than 1/2 to 1 centirH \•·t in diameter penetrat, 
Lisa's vaginal opening (Tr. 236, 237). 
around Easter time in 1981 Mildred Lairby put thr tines of a 
into her privates and caused her to bleed (Tr., 55), however, 
Elmo Grewell, a hospital physician who exarnned Lisa on April 2r, 
1981, testified that nothing had caused any bleeding in Lisa's 
vaginal area (Tr. 15). The above excerpts from Lisa's testimony 
render her credibility seriously suspect. Applying the afore-
mentioned legal standards of credibility to the testimony, the 
court should conclude as a matter of law that Lisa's testimony 
was inherently incredible, so much so that it raises a serious 
question as to the guilt of the Defendants. 
CONCLUSION 
The record of the proceedings in the trial court below 
proves that Appellants did not receive a fair trial. They \>:ere 
denied their right to cross examination, their right to present 
evidence in their own behalf, and their right to effective 
assistance of counsel. Based upon the foregoing points and 
authorities, the decision of the trial court should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted this 1st day of May, 1984. 
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